Mining cartel attack
I came across an idea that I think is worth discussing in regards to a kind of “attack” on the bitcoin network. I’m calling this a “mining cartel attack”. I have no idea if this is being done right now, and I’m being pre-emptive in terms of describing it as I’m sure the thought has come across the minds of some other people too. Perhaps I’m missing an essential element of Bitcoin here, but I think this could be a serious issue and I’m not sure of what protections, if any, are in place to stop this.
The assumption right now is that anybody can create a new block through the block generation system in place on Bitcoin and simply throw CPU cycles that eventually will be recognized in one form or another. So far that is true and in fact I’ve been able to create a block doing just that as have many on this forum and elsewhere. I consider that at least for the moment “proof” this attack isn’t happening right now, at least for myself. As long as everybody is being mostly honest and understanding that the strength of the network thrives by having as strong of a block chain as possible, this will continue to be the case.
Instead, in a “mining cartel attack”, I’m proposing that a substantial number of “miners” who possess a substantial fraction of the computing power of the network, but not necessarily 50% of the network, could form into a cartel that would only recognize blocks generated by each other. Perhaps they would let a few other blocks get past them from time to time to hide this attack, but the vast majority of the new blocks recognized by this cartel would have to be produced by cartel members. BTW, the “letting a few other blocks past” also reduces the percentage of the network needed by this cartel to pull off this attack as those other blocks are actually contributing to the overall strength by including “independent miners”.
Bitcoin works by recognizing the longest block chain in terms of proof of work. Since this cartel is mostly rejecting blocks from other nodes yet they have some substantial computing power under their control, they can create longer chains as a group than the rest of network, especially if the rest of the network is disorganized and consists of mostly small-time “independent miners” not in a cartel. It doesn’t take much here, even if only on occasion they are rejecting a few blocks from non-members of the cartel. This in turn, from an economic viewpoint, is going to strengthen the cartel members by “winning” more blocks and thus block generation coins and transaction fees associated with those chains more dominated by the cartel.
The programming for such an attack would be quite tricky, especially if you are trying not to get caught quickly that this kind of manipulation is happening. It is something that could “scale” with the proportion of the network controlled by this cartel as the closer they get to 50% control of the CPU resources of the network also regulates how many “non cartel” blocks can be rejected in favor of cartel members. I’d have to do some simulations to see what percentage of the network would be needed to reject any blocks from other miners as I don’t think a single PC could do this attack at all.
Presuming in an ideal situation where the mining cartel persists with this attack, on a social level many of the non-cartel members would drop out of mining (it is already happening anyway) as they simply can’t get their blocks recognized and think the effort of running the CPU isn’t worth the effort. Cartel members would be claiming that the issue is mainly because of increased mining difficulty (which may be true as well) but it should be noted that isn’t the only issue here. Still, the net effect is that the mining cartel ends up with an increasingly larger portion of the network and thus firmer control over the ability to manipulate the network to their own advantage.
Multiple cartels could also exist in this framework, with or without the knowledge of each other. There would be strong incentives to try and identify other cartels and certainly to propose a “merger” of competing cartels if possible under all sort of arrangements.
The primary issue on a technical level would be to identify which blocks belong to cartel members and thus should be used for building the next block of the chain by cartel members. This would likely be done “out of bandwidth” as a separate communication channel independent of the main Bitcoin communications network, although an “in bandwidth” scheme could also be set up.
The net harm to Bitcoin as a whole is that the block chain would ultimately be weaker as a result of this kind of attack, since CPU cycles “spent” by “independent miners” would not be recognized or used for difficulty adjustments on the network. This is also something that a government could use to “capture” Bitcoin if they were patient and were willing to work outside of legal attacks. Still, I see this mostly being done by self-interested participants who already have some substantial CPU resources and are simply being greedy. Transactions themselves would not be harmed and those with Bitcoins already in some form or another can arguably even be supported by such an “attack” as the miners are doing some of the “dirty work” involved with running the network… something cartel members would assert anyway as a sort of “public service”.
Is this something to even worry about? I don’t see an “easy” way to stop this sort of “attack” either, although there certainly are plenty of historical examples of similar kinds of “conspiracies” to restrain activity like this. Just look at DeBeers in South Africa if you need some examples to look at.
Related entries (1)
Related entries
What if somebody confiscate ArtForz’s mining rig? 😞
The mining cartel problem is real. The basic implementation outlined by RHorning is well understood but the more effective version outlined by mtgox is a serious problem. I have an obvious improvement to mtgox’s improvement as follows: Cartel miners only communicate their new generated blocks to other cartel miners. The cartel miners then try to find new blocks based on the previously found but unpublished block. The cartel miners have a certain probability of being one or more blocks in advance of the rest of the network. When a non-cartel miner finds a block then the cartel miners attempt to punish them by publishing up to 2 of their precomputed blocks. If the cartel miners were 1 block ahead then the non-cartel miner stands a fair chance of winning. Obviously the cartel miners will be busy using their block as the base to build the next block. If the cartel miners were 2 blocks or more ahead then their chain is longer and the non-cartel miner is punished.
People thinking that being a cartel member is suboptimal because honest miners supposedly make more money are neglecting the value to the cartel of punishing non-cartel miners.
ByteCoin
Related entries (1)
Related entries
The mining cartel problem is real. The basic implementation outlined by RHorning is well understood but the more effective version outlined by mtgox is a serious problem. I have an obvious improvement to mtgox’s improvement as follows:
If a cartel could somehow, by luck or circumstances, get “ahead” of the rest of the network for awhile, this sort of “attack” could certainly happen. “Saving” up blocks “in reserve” is certainly a way to get ahead for at least a short duration, releasing block into the network on an as-needed basis. Since the cartel would be ahead of the rest of the network, they would also be making hashes off of the latest block in the cartel, not the latest in the network.
The trick would be to decide when to “cut losses” if the cartel somehow ends up on the losing chain for a bit.
The whole point is that the cartel is “forcing” the rest of the network to “waste” their CPU cycles on blocks that aren’t going to be accepted. Any CPU cycles not spent on the longest block are clearly beneficial to the cartel.
There isn’t much lost if the cartel simply abandons a chain if they are one block behind. That is essentially what happens anyway if you are not in a cartel. You build upon the last block of the longer chain and move on. If you have a block in reserve, flush the block out to the network to compete as a split chain, but if you get behind simply try again.
BTW, are the “timestamps” on blocks put into the hash? I’m thinking more along the lines of trying to figure out how to detect if such an attack may be happening. Nothing conclusive, but I think you could “build a case” at least from a number of clues that such an attack may be underway from a series of “strange” things happening in the network. An unusually large number of “competing” chains and block timestamps that seem to be regularly out of order might be a clue. It would take some solid detective work including gathering data from “ignored chains”, but I think such an attack could be identified if it was a persistent attack. It wouldn’t be easily detected and a simple algorithm may not be sufficient in terms of blocking a particular node from submitting a block due to being in that cartel, but broadly speaking I think it could be detected as happening and possibly identifying which blocks “belong” to the cartel as more data comes in… unfortunately after the block has been firmly established into the chain.
This kind of “intel” could also be useful even for a cartel, as they might be able to detect if a second cartel is active. Tracing blocks and money spent might be useful to identify who could be in the cartel. Again, a single transaction might not be traced, but several transactions over a period of time tend to lose anonymity and certainly give some information not found with a single transaction.
