Anonymity and Traceability Review
The question is analogous to the US government’s current laws that any money transferred to terrorists by however long a chain implies criminal liability for the original transferer of the money offshore.
If you track the progress of a real USD $1 bill, from your pocket and it ends up in the pocket of a terrorist, at what point are you liable?
Using the logic you suggest the US Federal Reserve is the biggest terrorist funder of them all. (Discussion of whether they are actually deliberately funding terrorists omitted)
Using a bitcoin market will probably not solve the problem you suggest. And in fact probably makes things worse because it anchors your bitcoin transactions to your real world identity at 2 points. (assuming you’re not managing to anonymously buy BTC, in which case that DOES solve your problem and you can just ignore all the steps prior to 3d)
Just only do honest things with your bitcoins and you’ll be fine.
Anonymity in BitCoin is really a misnomer. It is really pseudonymity as all transactions are done through bitcoin addresses. An address is equivalent to the pseudonyms used on this site.
When people speak about anonymity/pseudonymity they usually mean link-ability. Can my pseudonym (address) be linked to my real world identity.
However, there is another important aspect, associate-ability. What can others learn about me by watching the behavior of my pseudonym. Because bitcoin is a publicly visible directed graph, link-ability is directly related to associate-ability.
Suppose you use the same handle and anonymous email here, as you do on a kiddie porn site. If that association was made you might be banned here, or even targeted by others. In the real world (and the generalized internet world) those associations are often hard to make. That tends to make people careless. However, in bitcoin these associations are trivial.
Associating your address with a set of behavior gives others a reason to attempt to link it back to you.
Every bitcoin comes to you from someone who knows enough about you to transact with you. When you spend the coins they go to someone who often knows you as well. Each interaction can leak information about you or your behavior.
You would think that single use addresses could protect you, however they can often be correlated easier than you think.
Suppose you want to buy a domain registry from privacyshark for 700 BTC. But you don’t want it associated with your well know bitcoin address in your footer here. So you decide to route it through three single use intermediary accounts (x, y, z). So create new accounts X,Y,and Z. Send 700 BTC first to X, then from there to Y, and from Y to Z. Finally you send the 700 BTC on to privacysharks well known address.
Well you are still screwed, because on the bitcoin directed graph, you just drew a straight line from your public address here to privacyshark’s public address. Each segment in that line correlates by value amount. They also correlate in time. (one hop each block at worst)
What if you try it differently, you send three different amounts from your public address to the three new addresses. 100 to X, 200 to Y, and 400 to Z. Then you send from X, Y, and Z individually to privacyshark. Well these amounts now create a neat diamond shape on the graph with you at the fork and privacyshark at the join. The transactions to and from X,Y & Z all correlate in time (perhaps even in the same two blocks). They also correlate by amount.
If you already happen to have coins at several addresses and you decide to sent 700 of them at once to privacyshark, I’m not sure exactly how the client generates the transactions but I do know, that they will still correlate by time and amount. Even worse it has the potential to associate non-single use accounts to one individual.
You can only de-correlate the timing by adding more latency. You can only de-correlate the graph connections by adding more hops. You can only de-correlate the values by adding more forking. All of these precautions reduce the utility of bitcoin and increase the complexity of transactions.
Is anyone going to go through all the bother to back-propagate your transaction graph just for buying a domain name? Well they might if privacyshark just registered “kiddieporn.com” and they are looking to link that to the buyer. And while doing that they might happen to correlate the anonymous registry of “IDontPayTaxes.com” with your “trade in bitcoin instead of paying taxes” post here.
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By the way, I’ve got an idea for an automated way of preserving true anonymity in the transaction list. It shouldn’t require any changes to the bitcoin system.
You may like to tell us what it is so we can tell you if we think it will work.
To make a truly anonymous payment, the sent address must be not be linkable to a particular person. All addresses belong to a particular key holder. So it’s an impasse unless we break the rule about an address belonging to one and only one individual.
So what I’m considering is a automated Tor hidden service that holds the private key wallet for a joint address that anyone can trade through. It would have to be a “trusted” service because obviously anyone with access to the private key could steal everyone’s coins. So for the sake of argument, presume that the service is not a scam.
Now an honest anonymity service could provide proof of its honesty using the following automated mechanism.
- Many users send bitcoins to the anonymizer address in advance like a checking account. Each of these are standard public transaction. That means the service can see who sent the coins and keep private account balances by sending address.
- Users communicate with the anonymizer through a Tor hidden service so there are no exit nodes that can spy. No one knows where the server is located to avoid other sorts of attacks. There are three messages that can be sent to the service. 2a. Send this transaction. 2b. Get Balance. 2c. Acknowledge Balance.
Send this transaction - takes as parameter a almost-standard transaction sending money from the anonymizer address to any recipient address. The only non-standard part of the transaction is that it is signed by the “account holder” rather than by the anonymizer. The system validates this signature and matches it to the depositors account in the standard way. It then checks the current account balance. If there is sufficient funds, the anonyizer simply removes the account holder’s signature, and resigns the transaction and broadcasts it. It then temporarily stores the original signed transaction request and updates the account balance.
Get Balance - the message returns the account holder’s current private balance and any confirmed account transactions.
Acknowledge Balance - once the account holder has reconciled his “checkbook” against the account records, he then signs his account balance and sends the signature in an acknowledgement message. When the system receives the acknowledgment it deletes the transaction logs and saves the signed balance.
So should any user try to repudiate the anonymizer’s honesty the system can show the user’s previous signed balance, any signed but unacknowledged withdrawals and any new new deposits (from the transaction log). These should sum to an unassailable current balance.
As with any mix-net, the system requires a large number of users to provide anonymity. It doesn’t do any good to have a single user anonymity system. It also requires a buffer with some latency. It doesn’t do any good to deposit 1234 BTC and then immediately send 1234 BTC to someone else using the system. That can be easily correlated just like in my previous post.
The optimal use would be for lots of users to make regular deposits (like a paycheck). Then they could request payments at will, just like with a checking account.
So to be optimally anonymous all users must:
- make regular payments
- have private/hidden balances
- communicate with the system through a non-observable channel
- make irregular payments (not matching public deposits)
Anyway, that’s the general idea. Feel free to shoot holes in it.
